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-w" -w1 -rheri invited to give this Memorial Lecture I was
\ /\ I honoured, but also daunted. How might I have
T T any competence to speak on anything that
would have interested William Dale as a topic (something
that seemed to me a sine qua non)? But then I realised that
the legal problems of the colonies and of the
Commonwealth, that were so much at the heart of his
professional life, have found their place in the court's
docket too. There was, in fact, a theme that suggested itself.' ' oo
The passing of imperial authority to the authority of 
independent rulers has entailed a prodigious amount of 
meticulous legal work for tfye Colonial Office and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office. They have had to ensure 
not only a smooth transition from ruler to ruled, but also 
certainty of borders between newly independent States, 
either or even both of which may have been under British 
rule. It is a tribute to their tremendous skills that 
generally this was accomplished with little difficulty. But 
not every eventuality can be foreseen and a significant 
percentage of the Court's cases on territorial title and 
boundary disputes have a British colonial background. I 
have only to mention the Northern Cameroons case 
(Northern Cameroons, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 15), the Cameroon v. Nigeria case 
(Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 
275), the Botswana/Namibia case (Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
(Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 
1045) to make my point. And sometimes, although the 
point at issue may not have been territorial title, the 
mysteries of British colonialism or of the Commonwealth 
have been an essential element of the case: the Mavrommatis 
Claims (Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, Judgment No. 5, 
RC.I.J. Series B, No. 11) and the India v. Pakistan cases 
(Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 46; Trial of Pakistani 
Prisoners of War, Interim Protection Order of 13 July 
1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 328; Trial of Pakistani 
Prisoners of War, Order of 15 December 1973, I.C.J. 
Reports 1973, p. 347) afford examples.
Of course, all of this could be added to by reference to 
those cases in the Court that are set against differento
colonial backdrops   the Tunis and Morocco case 
(Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 
Advisory Opinion, 1923, PC.I.J. Series B, No. 4), the 
great South West Africa cases (South West Africa, Second 
Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6.) the Western 
Sahara (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 
1975, p. 12) case, the Burkina Faso/Mali case (Frontier 
Dispute, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554) and fl 
dare I say it   the East Timor case (East Timor (Portugal v. 
Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90). But this 
evening I confine myself to the sphere that so preoccupied 
Bill Dale   the problems of British colonial and 
Commonwealth law.
I. THE PANOPLY OF BRITISH 
IMPERIALISM BEFORE THE COURT
Looking back at the docket of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, which began its work in 1922, and 
its successor the International Court of Justice, I am 
struck with how much of the panoply of British 
Imperialism has been before the bemused gaze of the 
Judges of those Courts. Judges from Russia, China, Japan, 
Venezuela and Hungary have proclaimed themselves 
engrossed by explanations of the British Empire and the 
Dominions, by tales of Colonies, Crown Colonies, 
Protectorates, Mandates, Trust Territories, Non-Self- 
Governing Territories.
o
Papers said to illuminate legal title may turn out to be 
documents of the Colonial Office, or the India Office, or 
the Commonwealth Relations Office, or the Foreign 
Office. These mysteries of provenance, too, my colleagues 
have learned to accept. They know about the departure of 
the Irish Free State, the comings and goings of South 
Africa and Pakistan many years later, the creation of the 
Unified Diplomatic Service in 1965, the amalgamation of 
the Commonwealth Relations Office with the Colonial 
Office, and the later merger of the Commonwealth
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Relations Office (of which Bill Dale was its last LegalN o
Adviser) with the Foreign Office to become the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office in 1968. In short, they 
understand more than does 95 per cent of the British 
public.
There is an understanding at the Court that each British 
colonial relationship found its place on a wide spectrum 
of possibilities. From the utmost degree of control to the 
loosest type of link, that spectrum ranges from colonies to 
territories under the League of Nations Mandate system 
or under the UN's trusteeship system, to States which 
had entered into agreements of varying form guaranteeing 
their protection. And even within these categories, the 
different degree of autonomy depended not only on the 
precise status concerned, but on the realities on the 
ground. India was not the Middle Last, the Middle East 
was not the Gulf, and the story of Africa is distinct again.
So far as British imperialism is concerned, the 
International Court has not had occasion to address 
international law issues under full colonialism: by that I 
mean that the full exercise of the authority of the Crown 
over geographically dispersed places, whether directly or 
with a significant degree of delegation, as in the case of 
the Dominions, has not been the subject of litigation. But 
other colonial relationships have indeed concerned the 
Court.
In the early mandates, later to be brought within the 
UN Trusteeship system, sovereignty did not lie with the 
Administering Power. The authority of Britain, as of any 
odier Administering Power, derived from internationalo '
agreements, ultimately supervised by the League of 
Nations in the case of a Mandate, or the UN in case of a 
trust territory.
Since 1921 Britain had been the Mandatory Power for 
Palestine. Mavrommatis, a Greek national, had already 
secured from the Ottoman authorities certain 
concessions for public works to be constructed in 
Palestine. Some of the characteristics of Britain as a 
mandatory Power were already to be seen in 1922, when 
it gave one Rutenberg a right to call for amendment of the 
Mavrommatis concession and informed Mavrommatis that 
his concessions would be recognised by the new 
Mandatory Power but that he should reach an 
understanding with his adversary. And eventually, his Jaffa 
concessions, but not his Jerusalem concessions, were 
recognised. The matter was brought by Greece to the 
International Court, which in a complicated series of 
Judgments, confirmed the validity of the original 
concession for Jerusalem and found the option to 
demand annulment granted by Britain to another 
concessionaire to be contrary to the international 
obligations accepted by the Mandatory for Palestine.
In 1961 the Republic of Cameroon, a UN trust 
territory, filed an application against the United Kingdom.
The points of law were quite different and relating to the 
questions put to the vote at the moment of 
decolonisation. Part was administered by France. The 
Northern sector granted to Britain (and this was to hold 
good also under the later UN Trusteeship system) was 
composed of two parts, divided by a narrow strip of 
territory of what was then the British Protectorate of 
Nigeria. Britain administered certain parts of Cameroon 
along with certain parts of Nigeria. In a complicated 
decolonisation process, the peoples of Northern 
Cameroons voted to achieve independence by joining with 
independent Nigeria; while the people of Southern 
Cameroons voted to join the independent (French) 
Republic of Cameroon. The UN endorsed these 
divergent results and terminated the Trusteeship 
Agreement. The Republic of Cameroon filed suit at the 
International Court, which found the case without object 
and would not pronounce upon the complaints.
The Mavrommatis case and the Northern Cameroons case 
thus dealt with quite diverse points of law. But each bore 
witness to the fact that in this type of colonial 
arrangement Britain did not have title to the territory and 
its administration was to be on behalf of the people of that 
territory, and not in its own interests.
There is currently pending in the Court a case that the 
Republic of Cameroon has brought against Nigeria. As in 
the case of Botswana/Namibia, it seems that not all matters 
of title and frontiers were as clearly resolved upon 
decolonisation as the colonial Powers had thought ando
hoped them to be. I shall say a little more about each of 
them in a later section of my talk.
If mandates and trust territories were rather familiar to 
the Court, the concept of a 'British protected State' was 
rather novel. But that has been the status of Qatar and 
Bahrain, in respect of which the Court has recently 
brought to conclusion a long and difficult litigation.
o o o
Formally speaking, the Qatar/Bahrain case was neither a 
colonial nor a Commonwealth case. At no time were 
Qatar or Bahrain (or indeed, any of the other Trucial 
Sheikdoms) British colonies. They were legal entities, 
with their own local Rules, before they entered into 
relationships with Britain. Their gradual development to 
full international personality depended on a variety of 
factors, of which the relationship with Britain was but 
one.
Their status vis-a-vis Britain was that of 'protected 
States'. This is a status that is rare, but not unknown, 
within the Commonwealth: Brunei, the Maldive Islands 
and Tonga forming the class. But, to make matters really 
complicated, Qatar and Bahrain, though protected States, 
were never within the Commonwealth. They were not 
colonies, and not within the Commonwealth. And, the 
judges of the Court who sought to grasp the precise nature 
of the relationship had to wrestle with the reality that 17
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while it may be possible to offer some generalisations as to 
legal relationships in British constitutional law and in 
international law so far as colonies and self-governing 
territories are concerned, the same cannot be said of 
protectorates or protected States.
As to Protectorates, there were of course common 
features in that their very status was based on the 
understanding that the Protecting Power would have all
o o
powers in the field of foreign relations and defence. But 
as the Permanent Court has observed:
'In spite of common features possessed by Protectorates 
under international law, they have individual legal 
characteristics resulting from the special conditions under 
which they were created, and the stage of their 
development.' [QUOTE] (Nationality Decrees Issued in 
Tunis and Morocco, PC.I.J., Series B, No. 4, p. 27.)
That observation is a fortiori true as regards the status
o
of Protected States in international law. It cannot even be 
assumed that it is powers in the defence and foreign 
relations fields that a Protected State will temporarily give 
up. The protection it seeks may be in diverse fields - and 
the Bahrain and Qatar treaties with Britain well illustrated 
this point. And there was no British power to legislate for 
Bahrain or Qatar.
From a constitutional law perspective, the same holds 
true. The Crown in right of the United Kingdom had 
jurisdiction, but not sovereignty over, territories under its 
protection (Fawcett, p. 118). These distributions of powers 
were a question of fact, to be ascertained in each case.
The Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890 mentioned two principal 
modes of acquisition of such jurisdiction: treaties and 
usage resting on acquiescence, both being of equal 
efficiency (ibid., p. 118). The Law Officers advised in 
1867 that formal treaties or agreements were not essential 
to the acquisition of jurisdiction, it being 'sufficient if the 
consent of the ruling powers were obtained and this might 
be evidenced by acquiescence, usage and sufferage' 
(Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law, p. 232). 
That 'consent of the ruling powers' was to be a critical, 
and deeply contested issue in the Qatar-Bahrain case.
But first, the treaty relationships
In the case of both Bahrain and Qatar there were 
relevant treaties.
Roberts-Wray, with whom Bill Dale shared an office 
when he first went to the Colonial Office, and who later 
became Legal Adviser of the Commonwealth Relations
o
Office, wrote in his classic work Commonwealth and Colonial 
Law, of Britain being responsible for the foreign relations 
and defence of Qatar and Bahrain. (So did Fawcett, The 
International Status of the Commonwealth and its Members, p. 
116.) But such powers are  not in fact set out in terms 
in these treaties. They are to be deduced from a reading
of the treaties as a whole, rather than stipulated in clearly 
and explicitly stated provisions. The relations established 
were not static, but evolved through treaties agreed over 
time, in response to particular historic events. Their 
original raison d'etre clearly lay in Great Britain's desire to 
prevent piracy in the Gulf and the desire of the various 
Sheikhs of the region to be secure from hostile action 
from other competing actors in the region. But it did not 
take long for Britain to see that there was much advantage 
to be had if British consent was also to be required for 
Bahraini trade and commerce.
The treaties with the Sheikhs of Bahrain thus gradually 
passed from agreements to deliver up slaves and to 
embargo the use of ships for slaving purposes; to a more 
general promise to abstain from piracy, slavery and 
'maritime aggression'; to most favoured nation trade 
advantages for 'British subjects of every denomination 
residing in Bahrain'. What Bahrain got in return was a
o o
commitment by Britain to obtain reparation for any 
injuries inflicted by others in the Gulf upon Bahrain. 
Gradually British power spread. Several treaties later 
(1880) the Sheikh and his successors agreed not to enter 
into negotiations or treaties with any other government 
without British consent, nor to allow foreign diplomatic 
or consular agencies to be established in Bahrain without 
British consent. By 1892 it was agreed that there would 
be 'no ceding, mortgaging or selling of any part of Bahrain 
save to the British Government'. And some 25 years later 
Sheikh Khalifa had signed an undertaking that:
'if there is any prospect of obtaining kerosene oil in my 
territory in Bahrain, I will not embark on the exploitation of 
that myself, and will not entertain overtures from any quarter 
regarding that, without consulting the Political Agent in Bahrain 
and without approval of the British Government'.
The treaty relations with Qatar started later, but 
followed a somewhat similar pattern   the slave trade, 
piracy, no relations with third States without British 
consent, no sale or cession of territory, and no granting of 
concessions (it was pearl concessions that were envisaged 
in Qatar waters). Importantly, all disputes were to be 
referred to the British Resident. Once again, all that
o 7
Britain offered for this and more was 'good offices' if
o
Qatar was attacked.
This brief summary shows two things. The first is that 
over time there were greater and greater erosions   albeit 
in the form of 'agreed to' treaties   upon the powers of 
Bahrain and Qatar respectively. The ability to exercise 
power in a variety of areas kept moving inexorably in 
Britain's direction. The second is that the exercise of 
power reserved for Britain now went far beyond that of 
foreign affairs. Indeed, the loss of control by Bahrain and 
by Qatar over the exploitation of natural resources, and of 
alienation of territory, go to the heart of the concept of 
ownership and title to property.
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This was the back-cloth to certain questions about 
which the Court had to satisfy itself in resolving whether 
the Hawar Islands, lying off die western coast of the Qatar 
peninsula, belonged to Qatar or to Bahrain.
The British authorities had in 1939 decided that title lay 
with Bahrain. What was the basis of its competence to 
decide? Was the consent by Bahrain and Qatar to 
determine the controversy necessary? Had that consent 
really been given? Or was consent not the key and should 
the substance of the decision be judicially reviewed by the 
Court, and if so by reference to wrhat criteria   the 
international law criteria of title, or the test of 
'reasonableness' ?
The starting point for the Court was that it was dealing 
with relations between States, in which it was agreed that 
one State would 'protect' the other. Accordingly, Britain 
could only decide by consent the issue of title to the 
Hawars. And it found, relying on correspondence 
between each of the two Sheikhs and the British Political 
Resident, that consent had been given. The International 
Court was content to hold Qatar to the consequences of 
that consent and declined to review in any way whatever 
the substance of the British decision.
All of this is, to an extent at least, clearly visible from the 
text of the Court's Judgment. But there was another 
element, also dependent upon the precise status of 
British/Gulf-State relations, that was not nearly so visible 
and which I think is of some considerable interest.
Bahrain had offered the Court a variety of arguments to 
support its claim to title in the Hawars. It contended 
that the Bahrain authorities, and they alone, had 
performed acts of sovereignty in the islands; and that this 
had been recogniSed by the British Government in its 
1939 award of the islands to Bahrain. At the oral phase of 
argument a new strand was introduced. It was proposed 
to the Court that the doctrine of uti possidetis also meant 
title lay with Bahrain. Indeed, counsel for Bahrain 
contended that if this argument was accepted, there was 
no need to go further on anything fl it disposed of the 
entire issue.
For the non-international lawyers in the audience, let 
me quickly explain that the doctrine of uti possidetis juris 
provides that States obtaining independence do so within 
the administrative frontiers set by the prior colonial 
government. The idea has its origins in Roman law and 
became of importance in international law as the Latin 
American States achieved their independence in the early 
1900s, usually from a single colonial ruler (Spain). In 
1964 it was voluntarily adopted as a principle by the 
Organisation of African Unity, which was concerned that 
independence should not be accompanied by intra-African 
fighting over colonial frontiers. In 1986, in the Burkina 
Faso/Mali case the International Court of Justice in turn 
confirmed that the principle:
'... is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific 
system of international law. It is a general principle, which is 
logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of 
independence, wherever it occurs' (I.CJ. Reports 1986, p. 565, 
para. 20).
The reach of the doctrine has been extended by the 
Badinter Commission in the Balkans, which has declared 
it applicable to disintegrating States. In the view of that 
body, the doctrine of uti possidetis operates to require new 
States forming within the older, larger State to respect, as 
their new independent frontiers, the former internal 
administrative frontiers within the federation to which 
they had belonged.
It will readily be seen that the underlying policy drive 
behind the doctrine is the stability of frontiers. Naturally, 
there is no suggestion that they cannot be altered through
OO J O
mutually agreed revisions: but the less they are tampered 
with unilaterally in a changing world, the better.
Could the doctrine apply to the frontiers that were 
necessarily implied by the British decision of 1939 over 
the frontiers? Because at the end of the day it based its 
judgment on the consent of the Parties, the Court did not 
have to answer the question. Judge Kooijmans, in his 
separate opinion, offered the view that the conditions for 
the doctrine did not exist, because, there was no transfer 
of sovereignty from a colonial power to a new State. Qatar 
and Bahrain had never been British colonies.
But there is an alternative way of looking at it, which 
also merits consideration.
It is true that the doctrine, thus far, has been associated 
precisely with such situations. Thus the Chamber in 
Burkina Faso/Mali was concerned with 'frontiers inherited 
from colonization' (I.CJ. Reports 1986, p. 633, para. 149) 
and it determined that 'by becoming independent, a new 
State acquires sovereignty with the territorial base and 
boundaries left to it by the colonial power' (ibid., p. 568, 
para. 30).
But the fact that thus far the doctrine has been applied 
by the Court in circumstances relating to classic 
decolonisation and State succession does not of itself 
answer the question as to whether it could and does apply 
upon independence from constraints that could 
reasonably be described as 'a more muted form of 
colonialism'. That question remains an open one, 
requiring careful analysis. It seems to me that we should 
be looking at substance, not form. If the formal question 
is 'was there State succession?' the substantive question is 
'was there a transfer of effective exercise of authority?'.
The reality is that colonialism came in many forms. The 
forms of colonialism were often a matter of 'historical 
accident'. One has only to read the terms of the various 
British Treaties with Qatar or with Bahrain, or indeed 
various other documents, to see that while 'existing State' o 19
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form' may have been preserved, the reality was still   I 
hope I am not offensive in saying this   a form of 
colonialism. We have seen that all the early treaties were 
a series of ever increasing obligations imposed on Qatar or 
Bahrain. There are many other illuminating indications of 
the realities too detailed for recitation here. Quite simply, 
the category of 'protected State' was merely a rather more 
courteous form of colonialism than characterised certain 
other categories. Even in internal judicial matters, as in 
legislative drafting, the role of the United Kingdom had 
assumed primacy.
Finally, and equally telling, Bahrain and Qatar were only 
able to resume full independence in 1971 with the consent of 
the United Kingdom. Is this not in reality a form of 
colonialism?
Who could doubt that Britain was effectively 'the 
administering power' in Bahrain and Qatar prior to 1971 ? It 
seems artificial to draw the line, so far as the uti possidetis 
doctrine is concerned, between this type of 'polite' 
colonialism and other types. In all these situations the 
underlying policy considerations of stability and the avoidance 
of fratricidal struggle (emphasised in the El Salvador/Honduras 
case, I.CJ. Reports 1992, p. 386; the Burkina Faso/Mali case, 
I.C.]. Reports 1986, p. 567 and the Libya/Chad case, I.CJ. 
Reports 1994, p. 37) have equal importance.
The Court was right to avoid entering into these difficult 
waters unnecessarily. But there is no reason of legal 
principle why the principle of uti possidetis should not apply 
upon the independence of these protected States; and 
there are strong policy reasons why it should.
I have one small footnote to add on the Qatar/Bahrain 
case. By the end of diis great case the Court knew all 
about Sheikhs, Emirs, the ins and outs of the British role 
in the Gulf from 1860-1971. But, in drafting its long 
Judgment, one insuperable problem remained. In 
recounting different events throughout this one hundred
o o
and ten years of turbulent history, it was asked of the 
British Judge when was it right to say 'Great Britain' and 
when 'United Kingdom'? The British Judge wished sheo o
could have lifted the phone to Bill Dale to have her 
approximate sense of things confirmed or amended. The 
Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office and the Research 
Department came to the rescue, and I trust that 'Great 
Britain', 'United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland', 
and 'United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
o
Island' all appear at their correct points in the Judgment.
India/Pakistan
In the recent litigation between Pakistan and India over 
an aerial incident in Kashmir, the Court has become deeply 
familiar with the details of the end of British rule in that 
sub-continent. In deciding whether it could indeed 
proceed to the merits, the Court found itself enveloped in 
a very singular slice of Commonwealth relations.
For a while it looked as if the International Court would 
find itself issuing an authoritative interpretation of the 
schedule to the Indian Independence (International 
Arrangements) Order issued by the Cover nor-General ol 
India on 14 August 1947. This Order was claimed by 
Pakistan to have the status of an agreement between India 
and Pakistan   itself a not uninteresting proposition. The 
matter arose in the following circumstances. One ofo
Pakistan's claims was that the Court had jurisdiction over 
the aerial incident by virtue of the so-called General Act of 
1928, a treaty which provided that the parties thereto 
would submit their disputes 'for decision to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice'. I shall leave 
aside the question as to whether the General Act survived 
the demise of the League, with which it was closely 
associated, and if so, whether the reference clause to the 
Permanent Court would be read as meaning today a 
reference of disputes to the International Court of Justice. 
These were clearly important questions for all parties to 
the General Act of 1928. But there were some questions 
that had a very specific colonial (or more correctly, 
dominion) resonance that would, I think, have intrigued 
Sir William Dale.
In 1931 British India had acceded to the General Act of 
1928. In the 1947 Indian Independence (International 
Arrangements) Order, it was provided that:
'rights and obligations under all international agreements to 
which India is a party immediately before the appointed day will 
devolve upon the Dominion India and upon the Dominion of 
Pakistan
Accordingly, in Pakistan's view, India and Pakistan both 
succeeded to the General Act 1928. But India pointed to 
another clause in the independence Order by virtue of
which 'membership in all international organisationsr o
together with the rights and obligations attaching to such 
membership, will devolve solely upon the Dominion of 
India'. And in India's view, it was through being a League 
member that India had become a party to the General Act. 
Pakistan was not, in today's parlance, a 'continuation State'.
India also drew the Court's attention to an Expert 
Committee, which in 1947 had been instructed, in 
connection with the preparation of the Indian 
Independence (International Arrangements) Order, to 
study the effect of partition on the treaty commitments of 
India (British India). That Committee had drawn up a list 
of such treaties   but the General Act did not appear. 
Pakistan in turn said that that omission was manifestly an 
error   and pointed to other omissions from the list of 
treaties generally acknowledged to bind India.
In any event, India had in 1974 notified the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations that:
'the Government of India never regarded themselves as bound 
by the General Act of 1928 since her Independence in 1947, 
whether by succession or otherwise'.
Amicus Curiae Issue 37 September/October 2001
I
And Pakistan had in 1974 notified the Secretary- 
General that it was bound by the General Act, and had 
been ever since independence, by virtue of the Order of 
1947. Moreover, in Pakistan's view that also described the 
position of India.
Before very long my colleagues from Venezuela, China, 
Algeria and Hungary had become experts on the legal 
history of the partition of India and the implications for 
international treaties. But, at the end of the day, the Court 
avoided an interpretation of the 1947 Order and its 
schedules, and also avoided pronouncing upon whether 
the General Act had in fact survived. Instead, it focused on 
that communication of India to the Secretary-General of 
1974 as the determinative factor.
Now I will at this juncture confess that I think there are 
strong policy reasons, when procedures exist in a treaty for 
its denunciation, against allowing States to extricate
' o o
themselves other than by recourse to denunciation. But I 
also recognise that that statement in itself begs certain 
questions in the particular case.
In any event, in a carefully worded passage (which I am 
surprised has not received more attention from the 
experts in treaty law) the Court said India could not have 
been expected formally to denounce a treaty to which it 
did not consider itself a party since independence. Its 
communication of 1974 to the Secretary-General thus 
'served the same legal ends as the notification of 
denunciation' provided for in the Act.
In sum, the General Act could not found the Court's 
jurisdiction in the case Pakistan wanted to bring 
concerning the shooting down of its plane.
Before leaving this deployment of the panoply of British 
imperialism before the Court, let me just add that in the 
pending case between Indonesia and Malaysia, the history 
of another British protectorate will be under our scrutiny. 
And this last week, we learned, during the hearings on
' ' o o
Philippine's request to intervene, that there was made 
with the Sultan of Sulu an agreement of protection by 
which the independent State of North Borneo would be 
administered not by the Colonial Office but by the British 
North Borneo Company. The history of the great 
chartered trading companies of Asia and North America 
remind us that the performance of public functions by 
private parties is not so much a new 'Third Way', as rather 
history coming round again.
II. IMPERIAL DECISION MAKING
It is possible to learn, through careful study of the 
pleadings and annexes of these great cases, much about 
internal decision-making in the heyday of British Empire.
The element most striking to Judges coming from the 
four corners of the world was the way in which British 
colonial governance was carried out on the ground by no 
more than a handful of Crown servants, without day to day
reliance on military force. These few people knew 'their' 
territories and the leading figures in them intimately. 
Further, one cannot read either the Botswana/Namibia case 
or the Qatar/Bahrain case without a strong sense of the 
commitment of the British Political Agent in the area to
o
'his' local rulers and people. This undeniable truth was in 
fact a point of controversy in the Qatar/Bahrain case. There 
was for long years a British Political Agent located in 
Bahrain, but no separate British Agent in Qatar (with 
whom British treaty relations started later). Undeniably 
close links were established between British civil servants 
and the Sheikh of Bahrain. A dispassionate reading of the 
documents do suggest a 'fighting of the Bahrain! corner'oo o o
by Belgrave, the Political Agent, and to an extent
J O ' O '
Weightman, which fact might have had greater weight in 
the Court's final decision had it not been for two factors. 
The first was that ultimately it is governments, and not 
civil servants, who take internationally contested 
decisions. And the second was the emphasis that the 
Court gave to the consent given by Qatar, as well as 
Bahrain, to His Majesty's Government determining the 
question of title to the Hawar Islands.
But these representatives of the Crown who were posted 
to the territories concerned do stride impressively across 
the pages of a court docket seventy years or more later. We 
all finished with our own clear sense of the character of 
Weightman, of Belgrave, of Lock, Fowle and Walton, 
among a myriad of agents and representatives in the Gulf. 
We came to know equally well the impressive figures of 
Trollope, Redman and Eason as we dealt with the 
Botswana/Namibia case. Trollope and Redman, respectively 
Magistrate of the Eastern Caprivi Strip and District 
Commissioner in Bechuanaland, were in frequent 
correspondence about maters that bore upon the key issue 
before the Court   the main channel of the River Chobe, 
which marked the frontier. Indeed, in 1948, though 
neither lawyers nor hydrographers, they wrote a joint 
report in which they expressed their common opinion on 
where the main channel ran. And Captain Eason, a police 
officer in Bechuanaland and manifestly a man of 
considerable skill in diplomacy, had also made a report on 
the channel, which had reached similar conclusions. The 
Court   though it ultimately too found the northern 
channel to be the main one   was careful not to rely on 
these opinions as 'State practice'. They were internal 
documents fl important to a general understanding of 




The desire of a district commissioner to do well by 'his' 
people, and the mutual understanding of civil servants in 
the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office 
as to the reasonableness of such a position, was also 
illustrated in the Trollope/Redman exchanges. They 
exchanged correspondence on the intractable problem of 
the channel and its relationship with the traditional use of 
an island in the region by the Caprivi tribesmen. The law 21
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and tribal practices seemed to pull in opposite directions. 
They saw a possible 'deal', which would retain the 
navigational rights of Bechuanaland on the one hand and 
the continued cultivation of law by the Caprivi tribesmen 
on the other. But their immediate political masters   the 
High Commissioner for Bechuanaland and the Secretary 
to the Soudi-African Prime Minister, respectively   saw 
the larger picture including problems of international law 
relating to the South West Africa Mandate, that could 
result. And the proposed 'gentleman's' agreement was not 
allowed to come to fruition.
The case law of the Court reveals, also, the complex 
lines of authority in the different types of colonial rule.
The Permanent Court had shown in the Mavrommatis 
case that the freedom of the colonial ruler to legislate or 
otherwise act may be constrained by the type of status 
accorded under international law to the territory in 
question. But the structures put in place to carry out 
colonial rule, rule in protectorate States and rule in 
protected States were infinitely flexible, reflecting the 
complex practices through time of the Colonial Office, 
Commonwealth Relations Office and India Office. In the 
Palestine Mandate the protesting concessionaire dealt not 
with the 'Zionist authorities', as the Permanent Court 
termed the local government there, but rather with the 
Colonial Office in London. Even when Greece made 
representations to the Foreign office about the 
Mavrommatis' concessions, it was referred to the Colonial 
Office. It was the Crown Agent for the Colonies which 
had signed the agreement with Mavrommatis's opponent, 
Rutenberg. But the actual grant of the concession to 
Rutenberg was made bv the High Commissioner of
O j O
Palestine.
The local authorities in Bechuanaland and South West 
Africa dealt directly with each other   a singular form of 
external relations, albeit at a level lower than that at which 
foreign relations are usually conducted. But anything that 
amounted to alterations of rights and obligations in a
O O
protectorate had to be referred to London for 
authorization. At the same time, these views of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office were communicated to 
the other State through the local protectorate officials, and 
never directly (even though South Africa at the relevant 
moment of time was still a member of the 
Commonwealth). One could say that there was a 
bifurcation between the locus of ultimate decision-making
O
power and the locus of external communication of those 
decisions.
It was to the British Political Agent in the Gulf that
O
Qatar and Bahrain presented their arguments for title to 
the Hawars. And he had been authorized by the British 
Political Resident to impart to Qatar the Crown's offer to 
decide the matter. It was, however, the Secretary of State 
for India who insisted that Qatar was entitled to a right of 
reply. And it is interesting to see that the decision of the
British Government, when taken, was sent by the Foreign 
Office to the Government of India, thence to the British 
Political Resident in the Gulf fl and only then, through 
him, to the Rulers of Qatar and Bahrain.
iii. the international court of justice and the 
COMMONWEALTH
Some nineteen Commonwealth countries have in force 
declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the court under 
Article 36 (2) of its Statute. It follows that some 35 
members of the Commonwealth do not give themselves or 
the Court this possibility. (Up to date figures have been 
conveniently compiled by Sims, Round Table (2000) at pp. 
212-3. He points out that this ratio within the 
Commonwealth is exactly the same as the ratio of UN 
members outside the Commonwealth who accept the 
Optional Clause to those who don't). Of course, there are 
other ways in which a case can be brought before the 
Court, notably, by agreement between the parties in 
respect of the particular dispute, and by having agreed to 
a treaty which contains a referral clause to the Court in 
case of a dispute arising under it.
There have in fact been rather few 'inter- 
Commonwealth' cases:
  Appeal relating to the Jurisdiction of the Council of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (India v. Pakistan)
  Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India)
  Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia)
  Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon
  v. Nigeria) [started just before Cameroon joined the 
Comm on wealth]
  Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia)
  Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India)
While all of them have entailed major points of 
procedural and substantive international law, the historical 
background of empire, decolonisation and 
Commonwealth has formed a necessary backdrop to an 
understanding of each. In some these issues have played 
an important part   as in the 1999 Aerial Incident case and 
in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case. I have spoken already of 
the latter. In the former the Court had to consider 
arguments relating to succession of treaties as independent 
India and Pakistan were born.
Botswana and Namibia are, to date, the only 
Commonwealth countries that have voluntarily and jointly 
brought their dispute for settlement to the Court. The 
maintenance of neighbourly relations and the avoidance of 
bloodshed was a high priority. In another interesting 
'first', they each declined the option to appoint an ad hoc 
judge, declaring themselves fully satisfied to leave matters 
to the permanent Bench of the Court.
Amicus Curiae Issue 37 September/October 2001
IV THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AND THE COMMONWEALTH 
RESERVATION
The case brought to the Court by Pakistan against India
O J O
concerning the aerial incident of 10 August 1999 obliged 
the Court to scrutinise the succession arrangements as the 
imperial era in India came to a close; it also brought back 
before the Bench an issue long dormant: that of inter se
o
doctrine in the Commonwealth. Pakistan appeared to 
face a major problem in bringing the case at all, in that 
India's current acceptance of the court's compulsory 
jurisdiction excluded from the Court's jurisdiction any 
State which 'is or has been a Member of the 
commonwealth of Nations'. Pakistan appeared to fall into 
both categories, having withdrawn in 1972 from the 
Commonwealth and rejoined in 1989, Pakistan 
necessarily had to persuade the Court of the invalidity of 
such a reservation. Its main line of argument was to 
suggest that all purpose to such a reservation had long 
since gone.
It is certainly not difficult to feel sympathy for the 
proposition that the original twin purposes underlying the 
so-called 'Commonwealth Reservation clause had now 
lost their relevance. This is not the moment for me to 
expound in any detail on the birth of the Commonwealth 
Reservation clause as a component element in 
acceptances of die International Court's jurisdiction by 
Commonwealth States. The works by Patrick Gordon 
Walker (The Commonwealth (1965)) and Lorna Lloyd (Peace 
Through Law: Britain and the International Court in the 1920s 
(1997)) are particularly illuminating on this history. But 
briefly put, from the outset relations between the 
Dominions, and between Great Britain and any one of the 
Dominions, were 'different from the relations between 
two foreign States and for this reason were not
o
international'. For this reason 'disputes between two 
units' of the British Empire could not come to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, which had 
jurisdiction only in disputes of an international character. 
There were the words used by Sir Cecil Hurst, the British 
Judge at the PCIJ (1929-1946) to explain the matter. The 
detailing of 'the Commonwealth Reservation through 
time' is admirably explained, with precision and clarity, by 
Nicholas Sims in his Round Table articles on the topic (see 
especially 'The Commonwealth and the ICJ', Round Table 
(2000), p. 354).
Thus the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New
o 7 ' 7
Zealand, South Africa and India all accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court with a 
'Commonwealth Reservation', in accordance with the 
inter se doctrine. This practice was continued by some 
(but not all) colonies and protectorates as they reached 
independence in the '60s and '70s and had to think about 
their acceptances of this Court's jurisdiction. 
Interestingly, to the extent that the inter se doctrine dido y 7
continue, it was unaffected by the post 1949 phenomenon 
of some Commonwealth members becoming republics. 
The Gambia, Kenya, Malta and Mauritius accepted the 
Court's jurisdiction with a Commonwealth Reservation 
clause.
But Uganda, Nigeria, Malawi, Swaziland and Botswana 
and New Zealand and Australia came to revise and 
eliminate their earlier Commonwealth Reservations. 
Cyprus and Nauru made no such reservation in accepting 
the Court's jurisdiction. And the United Kingdom in 
1969 adopted a (perhaps characteristic) 'half-way' 
position, replacing its old declaration of acceptance, 
complete with Commonwealth Reservation clause, with 
one that excluded 'disputes with regard to situations or 
facts existing before January 1969'. For the future, then, 
the United Kingdom accepted that relations with 
Commonwealth States were exactly as those with other 
sovereign States, at least so far as the settlement of 
disputes was concerned.
There was another aspect, too: in the Imperial 
Conference of 1926 not only had it been assumed that 
inter-Dominion relations were not really international 
relations, but it had also been intended that there should 
be an inter-Commonwealth Tribunal, which would be the 
more appropriate way to settle disputes. This idea never 
came to fruition and was essentially dead in the water by 
the Second World War. I have learned from Patrick 
Gordon Walker's book that an attempt to revive the idea, 
in the form of a peripatetic Privy Council dealing with 
intergovernmental disputes, was made by Joseph Cooray 
of Ceylon at the 1960 meeting of the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers. This particularly caught my attention as 
Senator Cooray later became my friend and colleague on 
the UN Human Rights Committee. He was to the core of 
his being a Commonwealth man: my inability to hold a 
sensible conversation with him on the great Inter- 
Commonwealth cricket matches of the day was a constant 
confirmation to him that the United Kingdom had not 
chosen its new member well. I was not a proper successor 
to Sir Vincent Evans.
We can, I think, indeed safely say that the original twin 
reasons for the Commonwealth Reservations clause have 
long since gone.
o o
But that perception, which was fully understood by the 
Court, was not enough to get Pakistan home against India 
in the recent case. Two insuperable hurdles remained for 
Pakistan: the first was that a State is entitled to accept the 
Court's jurisdiction or not. It may freely qualify its 
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, and does not have 
to ground that refusal, or qualification, in objective 
necessity or good sense. That recourse to judicial 
settlement is so tramelled at the beginning of the 2 1 st 
Century may be a matter of regret: but the legal position 
is clear.
23
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Interestingly, it was the action of two Commonwealth 
States which has raised in the minds of some Judges of the 
Court what they see as an issue of 'international law 
compatible' reservations. The recently added reference in 
India's Commonwealth Reservation clause to those who 
'had been' members of the Commonwealth was in reality 
directed at Pakistan. Pakistan was not slow to make this 
point to the Court, saying that it was in essence 
discriminatory. In the case that Spain brought against 
Canada in 1995 concerning action taken against a Spanish 
vessel outside Canadian territorial waters pursuant to 
recently adopted Canadian legislation, the issue arose 
again, in a somewhat sharper form. Canada had briefly 
withdrawn its acceptance of the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction, and replaced it with one containing a 
reservation not as to other parties, but as to subject matter. 
And the newly reserved subject matter   coastal State 
measures regarding fisheries, without specification as to 
maritime territorial limits   was precisely that envisaged 
by the new legislation and which led to the dispute. In the 
eyes not only of Spain, but also of some of my colleagues, 
a reformulation of a State's acceptance of the 
jurisdictional clause in order to exclude potentially illegal 
activity from the jurisdiction of the Court, presented 
certain fundamental problems for the Court. The Court's 
majority judgment, with which I agreed, thought 
differently, stating the jurisdiction and legality are two
different things. In any event, I hold the rather simple-o j ' r
minded view that a judge cannot begin to 'know' what isJo o
legal or illegal until he or she has heard full argument on 
the point. One should hold no views on legality at the 
stage of jurisdiction: they will be at best mere 'hunch' and 
should be avoided, so as to approach a hearing on the 
merits with an open mind.
The echo of the original 1926 intention that there 
would be a special way for Commonwealth inter se 
disputes to be resolved is still sometimes heard in the 
phrase that sometimes is added to 'Commonwealth 
Reservations': I refer to the declarations of acceptance 
which nonetheless exclude disputes with other 
Commonwealth members 'all of which disputes shall be 
settled in such manner as the parties have agreed or shall 
agree'.
The Court has not readily read prior arrangements 
between the parties as excluding its own jurisdiction. In 
the Land and Maritime Boundary case between Cameroon 
and Nigeria (Judgment on Preliminary Objections, 1998) 
Nigeria contended that because the two States had over 
the years engaged in joint activities directed to resolving 
their border problems, this was an implied agreement to 
resort exclusively to existing bilateral machinery and not 
to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court did not 
agree. No more did the Court accept that the parties 
were under an obligation to settle boundary disputes 
within the Lake Chad region by reference alone to the 
Lake Chad Basin Commission, so that the Court's
jurisdiction was not to be invoked in matters falling within 
the competence of that Commission. The Court found 
the Lake Chad Basin Commission not to be an organ for 
judicial settlement and its contribution to dispute 
resolution in that part of Africa thus did not displace the 
jurisdiction of the International Court.
In the recent Pakistan-India Aerial Incident case (Aerial 
Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 12), the issue arose in 
the entirely converse sense. Far from it being argued that 
another bilateral instrument precluded resort to the 
Court, Pakistan contended that the Simla Accord of 1972 
required resort to the Court. This was because by that 
agreement both States had resolved to settle their 
differences by negotiation or 'other peaceful means 
mutually agreed by them'. And, said Pakistan, as they had 
before the aerial incident in question each already 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, the Simla Accord 
now required judicial settlement there of the dispute. 
The Court did not find that persuasive and, in particular, 
the Simla Accord did not preclude India from relying on the 
Commonwealth Reservation contained in its declaration 
of acceptance.
CONCLUSION
As I bring this Memorial Lecture to a close it will be all
o
too apparent that I have spoken on only one of Bill Dale's 
two abiding interests in international law. I have not, as 
your invitations promised, spoken also on good drafting 
and clear language. The reality is that there turned out to 
be so much more than I could have anticipated to share 
with you on colonial and Commonwealth matters at the 
Court. In offering an apology to those of you who are 
really much more interested in that other element in the 
Lecture's title, I can only say that I hope at least that I have 
spoken of the Court's role in the areas of law so loved by 
Bill Dale directly, clearly and grammatically. @
Judge Rosalyn Higgins, DBE, QC
International Court of Justice, The Hague
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